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I. INTRODUCTION 
On June 23, 2016, the United Kingdom voted in a public 
referendum to leave the European Union. The margin of victory for the 
Leave Campaign was slight, 51.9% to 48.1%, and the fallout from the 
contentious and polarizing campaign has created perhaps the greatest 
rupture in British politics in over a century.1 David Cameron, the 
Conservative Prime Minister who initiated the referendum and led the 
unsuccessful campaign to remain in the European Union, resigned, 
stating that “fresh leadership was needed to enact Brexit.”2 In March 
2017 his successor, Theresa May, triggered Article 50 of the Treaty on 
European Union (“TEU”), the process by which a member state may 
leave the EU.3 The latter afforded the UK government two years to 
negotiate an exit deal.4 After failing to secure an overall majority in 
2017, the May government was forced to rely (by virtue of a 
“confidence and supply” arrangement) on support from the largest 
unionist party in Northern Ireland, the Democratic Unionist Party 
(“DUP”).5 After lengthy negotiations with the European Union, May 
brought a Withdrawal Agreement before the British House of 
Commons but on three successive occasions she failed to secure 
parliamentary approval for the deal. She too resigned in June 2019.6 
 
1.  See GEOFFREY EVANS & ANAND MENON, BREXIT & BRITISH POLITICS ix (2017); THE 
ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF THE POLITICS OF BREXIT 1, 15 (Nedergaard et al. eds., 2018); Will 
Jennings & Martin Lodge, Brexit, the Tides and Canute: The Fracturing Politics of the British 
State, 26 J. OF EUR. PUB. POL’Y 772 (2019); Nick Pearce & Gavin Kelly, Brexit and the Future 
of the British Model of Democratic Capitalism, 90 THE POL. QU. 1 (2019). 
2.  DAVID CAMERON, FOR THE RECORD 680 (2019). 
3. Article 50 provides that “[a]ny Member State may decide to withdraw from the 
European Union in accordance with its own constitutional requirements,” and “In light of the 
guidelines provided by the European Council, the Union shall negotiate and conclude an 
agreement with that State, setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the 
framework for its future relationship with the Union.” Consolidated Version of the Treaty 
on European Union art. 50, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 13, 31 [hereinafter TEU]. 
4. A member state can withdraw even if no agreement is reach providing that two years 
have elapsed from the time that the member state has notified the EU of its intention to withdraw. 
See Jochen Herbst, Observations on the Right to Withdraw from the European Union: Who are 
the “Masters of the Treaties?”, 6 GER. L.J., 1755 (2005); Phoebus Athanassiou, Withdrawal 
and Expulsion from the EU and EMU: Some Reflections, LEGAL WORKING PAPERS SERIES, 24, 
Dec. 2009. 
5. The DUP secured ten seats in the 2017 Westminster general election. Sinn Féin, the 
largest nationalist party in NI, has an abstentionist policy towards Westminster. See generally 
Mary Murphy & Jonathan Evershed, Between the Devil and the DUP: The Democratic Unionist 
Party and the Politics of Brexit, 1 BRITISH POLITICS (2019). 
6.  Oliver Wright & Francis Elliott, Theresa May in Tears as She Resigns, TIMES, May 24, 
2019, https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/theresa-may-resigns-qnt625hgf 
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May was replaced as Prime Minister by Boris Johnson, a former leader 
of the Leave Campaign who pledged to “get Brexit done.” 7 At the time 
of writing, having agreed to a new Withdrawal Agreement with the 
European Union, Johnson has been forced to request a further extension 
to the original two-year deadline for the departure of Britain from the 
European Union. In October 2019, Johnson called a general election 
with the express intention of securing a large enough majority to finally 
secure passage of the Withdrawal Agreement.8 He secured a large 
majority in that election and the Withdrawal Agreement was passed in 
January 2020. 
Although the consequences of Brexit for the peace process in 
Northern Ireland did not feature prominently in the referendum 
campaign in Britain, the issue has since moved front and center in Irish, 
British, and EU politics.9 Recognizing the widespread consensus 
amongst not just northern nationalists but also key figures in business 
and agriculture, and indeed the security services, that a hard border in 
Ireland should be avoided, the UK government agreed to a compromise 
with the European Union in November 2017. The so-called “Irish 
backstop” refers to a protocol appended to the 2017 draft Brexit 
Withdrawal Agreement. It provided that, in the event of the United 
Kingdom and European Union not agreeing to a future trade deal after 
the transition period had ended, the whole of the United Kingdom 
would enter a “single customs territory” with the European Union until 
 
[http://perma.cc/F4SB-EAY7]; Heather Stewart, Theresa May Announces She Will Resign on 7 
June, GUARDIAN, (May 24, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/may/24/theresa-
may-steps-down-resigns-tory-leader-conservative-brexit [https://perma.cc/W9HL-BT3H]. 
7. The Conservative Party slogan for the December 2019 General Election was “Get Brexit 
Done.” Billy Perrigo, ‘Get Brexit Done.’ The 3 Words That Helped Boris Johnson Win Britain’s 
2019 Election, TIME (Dec. 13, 2019), https://www.time.com/5749478/get-brexit-done-slogan-
uk-election/ [https://perma.cc/3TYA-YRPT]. Heather Stewart, Boris Johnson Elected New Tory 
Leader, GUARDIAN (July 23, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/jul/23/boris-
johnson-elected-new-tory-leader-prime-minister [https://perma.cc/PB6Q-Z62W]. 
8. To date three extensions of the original “two year” deadline have been requested by the 
UK government and granted by the European Union – the most recent at the time of writing 
extending to Jan. 31, 2020. Gordon Rayner, Boris Johnson to Use Huge Majority to Enshrine 
Brexit Date in Law – With or Without a Trade Deal, TELEGRAPH (December 16, 2019), 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2019/12/16/boris-johnson-use-huge-majority-enshrine-
2020-brexit-date-law/ [https://perma.cc/C4TL-8XLX]. 
9. See generally Cathy Gormley-Heenan & Arthur Aughey, Northern Ireland and Brexit: 
Three Effects on the Border in the Mind, 19 BR. J. POL. INT. REL. 497 (2017); see TONY 
CONNOLLY, BREXIT AND IRELAND 6-9 (2018); Paul Teague, Brexit, the Belfast Agreement and 
Northern Ireland: Imperilling a Fragile Political Bargain, in press, POL. QU. (2019). 
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such times as an alternative was agreed.10 This agreement was 
effectively superseded and replaced by the revised Withdrawal 
Agreement made between Prime Minister Boris Johnson and the 
European Commission in October 2019 and, as noted above, was 
finally passed into law in January 2020. A new protocol controversially 
provides for checks on what is effectively a customs border between 
Great Britain and the island of Ireland (a border down the Irish sea). As 
discussed further below this amounts in the eyes of many unionists to 
a “betrayal.” For his part, Johnson’s compromise is consistent with his 
earlier stated belief that the Irish border issue has permitted, “the tail to 
wag the dog” and that it is allowing the “whole of our agenda to be 
dictated by this folly.”11 This had never been the intention of those 
advocating Brexit. As one senior advisor to the Leave Campaign 
tweeted: 
. . . [a]lmost everyone’s tried to avoid saying, up to now, the Irish 
Border is not a top priority. No one wants to be responsible for any 
future unrest or lawlessness. But it is the blunt truth. What happens 
to the Irish border is far less important than that we truly leave the 
EU.12 
As is discussed further below, the Irish government and the pro-
remain majority of political parties in Northern Ireland have been 
solidly supported by the European Union in their determination to 
avoid a “hard border” in Northern Ireland lest it undermine the peace 
process.13 A key effect of the peace process was the removal of the 
physical border in Ireland. This was enabled partly by an improved 
security situation but also by virtue of the fact that both the United 
 
10. See generally Eileen Connolly & John Doyle, Brexit and the Irish Border, Special 
Issue, EUR. J. OF L. STUD. 153 (2019). 
11. Unattributed, Boris Johnson: Irish Border “Tail Wagging the Dog” Over Brexit, 
NEWS LETTER (June 8, 2018), https://www.newsletter.co.uk/news/boris-johnson-irish-border-
tail-wagging-the-dog-over-brexit-1-8526555 [https://perma.cc/UM84-MH4F]. Pat Leahy, ‘This 
Folly’: Boris Johnson on the Border Issue, IRISH TIMES, (July 20, 2019), 
https://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/this-folly-boris-johnson-on-the-border-issue-
1.3961728 [https://perma.cc/DTN7-XUA7]. 
12. Andrew Lillco (@andrew_lilico), TWITTER (Nov. 13, 2018, 1:42 AM), 
https://twitter.com/andrew_lilico/status/1062279529476038656 [https://perma.cc/9L3D-
CDAD]. 
13. Fifty-six percent of the electorate in Northern Ireland voted to remain in the 2016 
referendum versus forty-four percent who voted to leave. Rory Carroll, Barnier Pledges EU 
Support for Backstop in Event of No-Deal Brexit, GUARDIAN, (April 8, 2019), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/apr/08/barnier-eu-support-backstop-ireland-no-deal-
brexit [https://perma.cc/TMV3-RWH7]. 
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Kingdom and Ireland were members of the European Union.14 With 
security installations and customs posts removed, to all intents and 
purposes, the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic 
became invisible.15 Thirty thousand people cross this invisible border 
each day to work or attend school and approximately 1.8 million cars 
cross it each month.16 Successive British governments have stressed 
that they too are committed to avoiding a hard border in Ireland. They 
have, however, failed to persuade the European Union, the Irish 
government, or the pro-remain majority in Northern Ireland that such 
an outcome is feasible (e.g., through the use of technology) in a context 
whereby one part of the island of Ireland (the Republic) remains in the 
EU Single Market and Customs Union and the other (Northern Ireland) 
leaves.17 The difficulties associated with resolving this conundrum 
have been at the center of the British government’s negotiations and 
discussions with Ireland and the other EU member states since the 
Brexit referendum. Moreover, Brexit has thrown into sharp relief a 
range of important human rights and legal considerations concerning 
not just trade and commerce but also contested political and national 
identity issues which lay at the heart of the conflict in the first place. 
The research which underpins this article arises from two projects. 
The primary source is a project funded by the Economic and Social 
Research Council (“ESRC”) which focused on a range of Brexit related 
themes in Northern Ireland including the impact on the peace process.18 
Following an extensive interdisciplinary literature review, original data 
was gathered using a range of methodologies between April 2017 and 
 
14. See Gormley-Heenan & Aughey, supra note 9. 
15. See Katy Hayward, The Pivotal Position of the Irish Border in the UK’s Withdrawal 
from the European Union, 22 SPACE & POLITY 238 (2018). 
16. Etain Tannam, Brexit and British Irish Relations, 163 RUSI J. 4, 4 (2018). 
17. The European Single Market is the trading area described by the European 
Commission as “one territory without any internal borders or any regulatory obstacles.” It is 
built upon the “four freedoms” of the EU which permit the free movement of goods, capital, 
services and labor. The EU Customs Union applies to countries within which customs (tariffs 
and duties) have been removed from goods and ensures that countries charge the same import 
duties to countries outside of the single market. For a detailed discussion, see generally 
CATHERINE BARNARD, THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF THE EU: THE FOUR FREEDOMS (2016). 
18. Brexit and Northern Ireland: The Constitutional, Conflict Transformation, Human 
Rights and Equality Consequences (Grant Reference ES/R001499/1), UK RES. AND 
INNOVATION, https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=ES/R001499/1 [https://perma.cc/WYW6-
NVLC] (last visited Nov. 21, 2019). As well as the Authors, the project team included Professor 
Colin Harvey (Queen’s University), Professor Rory O’Connell (Ulster University), and the staff 
of the local human rights NGO, the Committee on the Administration of Justice. 
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March 2019. Using a purposeful sampling methodology, twenty semi-
structured qualitative interviews were conducted with legal, political 
and policy experts across the United Kingdom and Ireland. Forty-four 
informal bilateral meetings were also carried out as well as six public 
“townhall” meetings across Northern Ireland. All qualitative data were 
coded using NVivo software. In addition, two of the authors conducted 
specific peace process focused interviews with key interlocutors 
(including mainstream and “dissident” republicans, loyalists, as well as 
policing and security experts) as part of a project on the role of 
apologies in dealing with the legacy of the past.19 
Our central thesis in this Article is that the Leave Campaign and 
the determination to enact Brexit at all costs by sections of the British 
Conservative party has re-energized a variant of English nationalism 
and nostalgia for empire which has had a direct consequence on the 
peace process in Northern Ireland and upon relations across the island. 
In order to test the veracity of that proposition, we examine in detail a 
number of key components of the relationship between the peace 
process and the European Union. 
First, drawing from the literature on imperialism and post-
colonialism, we suggest how such a perspective helps us to make sense 
of elements of Brexit. We then explore in more detail how Brexit has 
impacted on aspects of the peace process in Ireland. Having reviewed 
the ways in which EU membership helped improve Anglo-Irish 
relations, we chart the deleterious consequences of Brexit. We then 
examine the role of the European Union in the peace process, the Good 
Friday Agreement and the transition from conflict since 1998. Next, we 
explore the impact of Brexit on political relations within Northern 
Ireland, including the mainstreaming of the debate on Irish 
reunification. We then examine the relationship between Brexit and the 
risk of future political violence and the challenges to the governance of 
security. In the final section, we argue that law in general and human 
rights guarantees, in particular, were central to the peace process. In 
analyzing the major Brexit-related legal challenges, we examine some 
notable government defeats concerning UK parliamentary sovereignty. 
However, we argue that law has largely failed to protect the peace 
 
19. Apologies, Abuses and Dealing with the Past: A Socio-Legal Analysis (Grant 
Reference ES/N010825/1), UK RES. & INNOVATION, 
https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=ES%2FN010825%2F1 [https://perma.cc/2VBQ-TUSD] (last 
visited Nov. 21, 2019). That project is ongoing but to date a total of thirty conflict related 
interviews have been conducted. 
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process from the reckless imperial impulses provoked by Brexit. We 
conclude by considering what lessons can be learned from the Brexit 
experience concerning the role of law in general and human rights 
guarantees in particular as the constitutional conversations about a 
united Ireland gather momentum. 
II. BREXIT, EMPIRE NOSTALGIA, AND THE PEACE PROCESS 
On the one hand, Brexit is fueled by fantasies of “Empire 2.0”, a 
reconstructed global mercantilist trading empire in which old 
white colonies will be reconnected to the mother country. On the 
other, it is an insurgency and therefore needs to imagine that it is 
a revolt against intolerable oppression. It therefore requires both a 
sense of superiority and a sense of grievance. Self-pity is the only 
emotion that can bring them together.20 
A detailed analysis of the political origins of Brexit and the 
success of the Leave Campaign is beyond the space available here. 
Such a discussion would include unpicking the complex interplay 
between English nationalism and English national imagination, 
populism, structural exclusion in the neo-liberal global economy, 
xenophobia, the cumulative influence of a largely anti-EU press over 
several decades, opportunistic venture capitalism, “dark money” and 
Russian interference in the campaign, the complacency of the British 
political establishment and the lure of British nostalgia for empire.21 In 
this Article, we have chosen to focus on the imperial nostalgia element 
as being the most useful in offering insights into the attitude of 
Brexiteers to the Irish peace process. Of course, at one level, the fact 
that English nationalists didn’t care/weren’t interested in Northern 
Ireland in pressing for Brexit is not entirely surprising. It has long been 
a truism of politics in Northern Ireland (admitted mostly only in private 
by unionists) that there is limited interest or understanding in Britain of 
 
20. FINTAN O’TOOLE, HEROIC FAILURE: BREXIT AND THE POLITICS OF PAIN 3 (2018). 
21. See generally ARRON BANKS, THE BAD BOYS OF BREXIT: TALES OF MISCHIEF, 
MAYHEM AND GUERRILLA WARFARE IN THE EU REFERENDUM CAMPAIGN (2016); HAROLD 
CLARKE ET AL., BREXIT: WHY BRITAIN VOTED TO LEAVE THE EUROPEAN UNION (2017); 
GEOFFREY EVANS & ANAND MENON, BREXIT & BRITISH POLITICS (2017); DANNY DORLING 
& SALLY TOMLINSON, RULE BRITANNIA: BREXIT & THE END OF EMPIRE (2019); 
INFORMATION COMMISSIONER’S OFFICE, INVESTIGATION INTO THE USE OF DATA ANALYTICS 
IN POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS 7 (Nov. 6, 2018), https://ico.org.uk/media/action-weve-
taken/2260271/investigation-into-the-use-of-data-analytics-in-political-campaigns-final-
20181105.pdf [https://perma.cc/6WJC-G3EJ] (last visited Nov. 15, 2019). 
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the complex politics of this island.22 There have been periodic episodes 
when Northern Ireland featured prominently in British politics, 
including those related to particular security crises during the conflict, 
key moments of the peace process, and (as recently) when the 
arithmetic at Westminster meant that the Northern Ireland votes 
mattered to governments with a thin majority. However, as Catterall 
and McDougall have argued, one constant of British policy has been to 
marginalize as far as possible the place of Northern Ireland in British 
politics.23 Taking such a lack of curiosity as a given, we would 
nonetheless argue that Brexit has thrown into sharp relief some 
previously obscured imperial dimensions to the relationship. 
For current purposes, we propose that at least three interrelated 
empire nostalgia themes impacted directly on the peace process. These 
were the blind spots in Britain with regard to the consequences of 
Brexit in Ireland, 24 the curious political footwork involved in framing 
the former imperial power as a victim of EU entrapment, and the 
particular version of sovereignty asserted in the Brexit mantra to “take 
back control.”25 This Article will not deploy a colonial or post-colonial 
lens to analyze politics in Northern Ireland per se.26 Rather, we use this 
perspective to better understand British disregard for the Irish peace 
process. 
In the short time since the Brexit referendum, there has been 
significant discussion in the more left-leaning press in the United 
Kingdom and Ireland about the relationship between Brexit and 
memory of the empire. While some of this criticism is undoubtedly 
“saddling Brexit” with “as much odious baggage as its enemies can 
muster,”27 to be fair, the advocates of Brexit have given their critics 
rich material with which to work. For example, Boris Johnson (former 
Foreign Secretary, now Prime Minister) has deliberately invoked 
 
22. As John Morison frequently reminds us, for a British audience, the “two most boring 
words run together in the English language are Northern and Ireland.” 
23. THE NORTHERN IRELAND QUESTION IN BRITISH POLITICS 9 (Peter Catterall & Sean 
McDougall eds., 1996). 
24. Ian Manners, Political Psychology of European Integration: The (Re) Production of 
Identity and Difference in the Brexit Debate, 39 POL. PSYCHOL. 1213, 1223 (2018). 
25. See generally Andrew Gamble (2018) Taking Back Control: The Political 
Implications of Brexit, 25 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 1215 (2018). 
26. For competing accounts of the utility of such an approach to understanding Northern 
Ireland, SEE BRENDAN O’LEARY, A TREATISE ON NORTHERN IRELAND: COLONIALISM (2019); 
LIAM KENNEDY, COLONIALISM, RELIGION & NATIONALISM IN IRELAND (1996). 
27.  Stuart Ward & Astrid Rasch, Introduction Greater Britain Global Britain, in EMBERS 
OF EMPIRE IN BREXIT BRITAIN 4 (Stuart Ward & Astrid Rasch eds., 2019). 
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Britain’s imperial past—appealing directly to the ingenuity of a people 
“who used to run the biggest empire the world has ever seen.”28 As 
discussed further below, leading Brexiteer Member of Parliament 
(“MP”), Jacob Rees-Mogg, published a book in 2019 titled “The 
Victorians,” celebrating prominent British figures led by the woman he 
describes as “Her Imperial Majesty Queen Victoria.” In his view, they 
comprised a generation “who had confidence in their civilizing effort, 
a belief in the goodness of their own nation and the drive necessary to 
finish the job.”29 In the short time since the Leave Campaign got 
underway, a rich sociological, political and anthropological literature 
has emerged linking the growth of Euroscepticism in Britain with 
imperial nostalgia, culminating in the Brexit vote.30 
The practical expressions of Euroscepticism in Britain have been 
evident in Britain for decades. Although it was founded in 1957, the 
United Kingdom declined to join the European Economic Community 
(“EEC,” a predecessor to the European Union) until 1973.31 In the 
subsequent 1975 European referendum, support for EEC membership 
was relatively high, with a majority of 62.7% voting that the United 
Kingdom should stay in the EEC and a minority of 32.8% voting to 
leave.32 Despite this initial majority support, segments of the two 
largest UK political parties (Conservatives and Labour) have remained 
“ambivalent or hostile to European integration.”33 A former 
Conservative British Prime wrote after leaving power that “Europe as 
a whole is fundamentally unreformable,” continuing later that the 
European Union is “a classic utopian project, a monument to the vanity 
of intellectuals, a programme whose inevitable destiny is failure.”34 
This political wariness was evidenced in the United Kingdom’s 
somewhat semi-detached approach to the European Union, as reflected 
 
28. Boris Johnson, Opinion, There is Only One Way to Get the Change We Want: Leave 
the EU, THE TELEGRAPH, March 16, 2016, 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/2016/03/16/boris-johnson-exclusive-there-is-only-one-
way-to-get-the-change/ [https://perma.cc/Y6LS-WNNT]. 
29. JACOB REES-MOGG, THE VICTORIANS xvii (2019). 
30. See generally BENJAMIN GROB-FITZGIBBON, CONTINENTAL DRIFT: BRITAIN & 
EUROPE FROM THE END OF EMPIRE TO THE RISE OF EUROSCEPTICISM (2016). 
31. Andrew Gardner, Brexit, Boundaries & Imperial Identities: A Comparative View, 17 
32. See results at: Richard Nelson, Archive: How the Guardian Reported the 1975 EEC 
Referendum, GUARDIAN (June 15, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/politics/from-the-
archive-blog/2015/jun/05/referendum-eec-europe-1975 [https://perma.cc/8YC4-74E8]. 
33. Gardner, supra note 31, at 5. 
34. MARGARET THATCHER, STATECRAFT: STRATEGIES FOR A CHANGING WORLD 320, 
359 (2002). 
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in its successfully negotiated opt-outs to the Euro currency, the 
“Schengen area” (obviating the need for passports and border controls 
within twenty-six EU countries), and a number of Justice and Home 
Affairs measures.35 Within British politics, the emergence in 1993 of 
the single issue United Kingdom Independence Party (“UKIP” recently 
usurped by the Brexit Party) made the management of the Eurosceptic 
wing of the Tory party all the more challenging—what former Prime 
Minister David Cameron has referred to as “the Nigel Farage Factor” 
(the ubiquitous leader of first UKIP, then the Brexit party).36 This in 
turn contributed significantly to Cameron’s decision to commit to a 
campaign pledge of an in/out referendum on EU membership in the 
2015 general election.37 
At a theoretical level, the relationship between Euroscepticism 
and the imperial afterlife in the collective English imagination is of 
course quite complex. For some commentators, the most interesting 
element was the Leave Campaign’s “tendency to romanticise the days 
of the British Empire, a time when Britannia ruled the waves and was 
defined by her racial and cultural superiority.”38 When Prime Minister 
Theresa May gave her first speech after the leave vote, she referred to 
“global Britain” no less than twelve times.39 In 2017, when the 
Secretary of State for International Development, Liam Fox, traveled 
to former African colonies (now members of the British 
Commonwealth) to boost post-Brexit trade links, it was the staff from 
his office who branded the visits as “Empire 2.0.”40 For others, the 
 
35. See generally JULIE SMITH, THE UK’S JOURNEYS INTO AND OUT OF THE EU (2018). 
36. CAMERON supra note 2, at 511. 
37. See generally ANDREW GLENCROSS, WHY THE UK VOTED FOR BREXIT: DAVID 
CAMERON’S GREAT MISCALCULATION (2018). 
38. Nadine El-Enany, Brexit is Not Only an Expression of Nostalgia for Empire, it is also 
the Fruit of Empire, LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS (Nov. 5, 2017), 
https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2017/05/11/brexit-is-not-only-an-expression-of-nostalgia-for-
empire-it-is-also-the-fruit-of-empire/ [https://perma.cc/4XKK-PEW6]. One vox pop TV 
interviewee, seemed to capture this mood well when he said, “We’re British. We stood alone for 
years. I was watching a thing with the Queen, there was billions of people in the Empire. Let’s 
get back to being a British Empire again . . . [t]hat’s what it’s all about, you know? It’s about 
being a British Empire.” News Report, Leave Voter: ‘Let’s be a British Empire Again,’ SKY 
NEWS (Oct. 20, 2018), https://news.sky.com/video/lets-get-back-to-being-a-british-empire-
11530606 [https://perma.cc/AE4J-GDVT]. 
39. Theresa May, The Government’s Negotiating Objectives for Exiting the EU: PM 
Speech, PRIME MINISTER’S OFFICE (Jan. 17, 2017), https://www.gov.uk 
[https://perma.cc/Y9FA-F2WF]. 
40. Sam Coates, Ministers Aim to Build “Empire 2.0” With African Commonwealth, 
TIMES (Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/ministers-aim-to-build-empire-2-0-
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yearning for past greatness—what Paul Gilroy has termed the “aching 
loss” of empire41—was skillfully wedded by Brexiteers to promises of 
a post-Brexit utopia wherein the health service would be better funded 
by money that would otherwise be absorbed by the European Union 
and a plethora of new trade deals would transform communities hard 
hit by austerity.42 Even less savory were the undoubtedly racialized 
efforts by the Leave Campaign to frame migrant workers as a threat to 
the white working classes and to brand people of color more generally 
as undesirables and potential terrorists who were committed to entering 
Britain because of what Nigel Farage termed “the EU’s open 
borders.”43 
Some of those involved in the Leave Campaign have been quite 
honest about how little Northern Ireland and the peace process featured 
in the Brexit deliberations.44 This Article holds that this “blind spot” 
had undoubted imperial dimensions. The imperial gaze is inevitably 
drawn to the farthest horizon of the empire. It is the scale, reach, 
distance and “otherness” of the lands and people who fall under the 
control of an empire—what Homi Bhabha calls the relationship 
between “cultural difference and colonial nonsense”—that reinforces 
 
with-african-commonwealth-after-brexit-v9bs6f6z9 [https://perma.cc/23DS-GJSZ]. See also 
DAVID THACKERAY & RICHARD TOYE, EMBERS OF EMPIRE IN BREXIT BRITAIN 15 (Stuart 
Ward & Astrid Rasch eds., 2019). 
41. PAUL GILROY, AFTER EMPIRE; MELANCHOLIA OR CONVIVIAL CULTURE? 95 (2004). 
42. See Craig Calhoun, Populism, Nationalism and Brexit in BREXIT SOCIOLOGICAL 
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pictured Middle Eastern refugees queuing at the EU borders with a strap line that read, “We 
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the superiority of those who rule and administer it.45 Ireland was 
Britain’s oldest and closest colony. We would argue further that the 
duration and proximity of the colonial relationship with Ireland—”the 
tall kingdom over your shoulder” as the poet Seamus Heaney described 
it—helps explain the oversight.46 Ireland’s relative smallness, 
superficial “sameness,” yet dreary complexity and durable conflict all 
contributed to Ireland being literally overlooked in the expansive Brexit 
imperial fantasy.47 
Ireland has also become enmeshed with the Brexit-inspired notion 
of Britain as a victim of colonialism. In the wake of the referendum, 
particularly as the realization that the Irish border had assumed a 
pivotal position in preventing getting Brexit done,48 Ireland became an 
increasing source of irritation and exasperation for those who wished 
to cut free from the entanglements of the European Union. As late as 
January 2019, despite over two and a half years of negotiation, Boris 
Johnson continued to assert that the Irish border problem was “easily 
capable of solution.”49 In reality, however, the border came to 
symbolize the ways in which the breezy self-confidence of leading 
Brexiteers was being thwarted by the real-world complexities of 
unpicking multi-tiered legal, economic, financial, institutional and 
diplomatic relationships developed over more than four decades. 
Frustrated by the unanticipated complexity of leaving the European 
Union, leading Brexiteers repeatedly cast Britain as a victim of EU 
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For a more sympathetic account, see NIALL FERGUSON, EMPIRE; HOW BRITAIN MADE THE 
MODERN WORLD (2003). 
46. This phrase is used by Seamus Heaney in his poem Act of Union published in the 
collection NORTH (1975). Seamus Heaney, Act of Union, in NORTH (1975). 
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colonialism.50 Fintan O’Toole has insightfully and wittily captured the 
curious psycho-political rationale at play in the framing of Britain’s 
membership of the European Union as the painful submission of a 
once-great colonial power to the clamps of the EU empire.51 The Irish 
government’s insistence upon a legally binding “backstop” in the 2017 
Agreement in order to avoid a hard border in Ireland—which for many 
Brexiteers was to risk continued colonial entrapment—was beyond 
infuriating. One particularly naïve alternative offered by the former 
Conservative Chancellor of the Exchequer and chair of the Leave 
Campaign, Sir Nigel Lawson, was that the Irish Republic would “say 
we made a mistake in getting independence in 1922, and come back 
within the United Kingdom. That would be great.”52 
Brexiteers have also engaged in an inversion of what Bhabha has 
termed mimicry - except in this case the former colonizer adapts and 
utilizes the language and tactics of the historically subaltern (the Irish) 
and “ . . . appropriates the other as it visualizes power.”53 In reaching 
for historic analogies for noble efforts at resistance to the colonial yoke 
of the European Union, Brexiteers have drawn approvingly from Irish 
republican history. Brexiteer Member of the European Parliament, 
Daniel Hannan, in rationalizing his approval of a compromise proposal 
from Theresa May in 2018, likened Theresa May’s 2018 compromise 
proposal to the stance taken by the pro-Treaty Irish Republican Army 
(“IRA”) in “grabb[ing] what looked like an imperfect independence 
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and then buil[ding] on it rather than risking the entire process.”54 In a 
similar vein, hardline Tory Brexiteer MP, Owen Patterson,55 quoted 
from a 1921 speech by the pro-Treaty IRA leader Michael Collins to 
rationalize his acceptance of the Johnson compromise in October 
2019.56 The irony of Brexiteers casting Britain as the victim of EU 
colonialism and then drawing inspiration from previous IRA leaders to 
justify their escape plans has not surprisingly generated some mirth in 
Ireland.57 
The third related imperial dimension to the relationship between 
the Brexit project and the Irish peace process is the version of 
sovereignty promoted by Brexiteers. Sovereignty within the Brexit 
project is encapsulated in the Leave slogan “take back control.”58 As 
Freeden and others have argued, making this the center-piece was key 
to the success of the campaign.59 There is, of course, a rich 
interdisciplinary literature on the concept of sovereignty across law, 
politics, sociology, and other disciplines, and indeed a rich stream of 
scholarship specifically on sovereignty and the European Union.60 For 
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666, Col 893. 
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current purposes, we are most interested in the ways in which what 
King has called “sovereignty hysteria”61 illustrated by the claim that 
leaving the European Union would amount to “Independence Day” for 
the United Kingdom,62 resonated with imperial and popular notions of 
sovereignty rather than the complex legal understanding of the term 
which most UK constitutional lawyers have become familiar since 
devolution (discussed further below in the concluding section). Indeed 
we would argue that sovereignty has been deployed politically in the 
Brexit debate as a populist imperial slogan—”the will of the 
people”63—deliberating obfuscating distinctions between internal and 
external notions of sovereignty, parliamentary sovereignty, and the 
national sovereignty of the United Kingdom as a state engaging in 
supranational and international relationships.64 Although the primacy 
of parliamentary sovereignty featured heavily in Brexiteer slogans 
during the campaign, as parliament proved a major obstacle to 
implementing the Brexit vision, it was ultimately and unlawfully 
prorogued by the Johnson administration.65 Popular sovereignty, as 
expressed through the narrow Leave victory, has been interpreted by 
pro-Brexit advocates as a one off expression of the will of the people 
and they have fought a relentless and successful campaign against a 
second referendum wherein the detail of the deal agreed with the 
European Union and its economic and political consequences could be 
considered in a final referendum.66 
From such a vantage point, the refusal by the Irish government 
and the other twenty-six EU member states to countenance a hard 
border in Ireland in order to facilitate Brexit has been an abrogation of 
the sovereignty of the people in Britain. A key complicating factor, and 
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one with an obvious colonial dimension, is that this fails to take account 
of the fact that fifty-six percent of the people of Northern Ireland voted 
remain in the Brexit referendum.67 Former British Prime Minister, 
Margaret Thatcher, famously declared in 1981 that Northern Ireland 
was as much a part of the United Kingdom as her own constituency of 
Finchley.68 Echoing this, Boris Johnson has compared the Irish border 
to the boundaries between different boroughs of London.69 Of course, 
Northern Ireland is neither Finchley nor Camden. The entire peace 
process is premised on the uniqueness of Northern Ireland. The 
requirement for a devolved Assembly with bespoke voting 
requirements for cross-community consent, the North South 
Ministerial Council between Northern Ireland and the Republic, and all 
of the other elements of the complex constitutional architecture of the 
Good Friday Agreement speak to the post-conflict need for what 
Anthony has termed a “diffuse conception of sovereignty”70 Having 
explored the ways in which “empire nostalgia” illuminates the Brexit 
crisis, we now consider the detailed out-workings of Brexit with regard 
to the peace process in Ireland. To begin, we offer an overview of 
Anglo-Irish relations before and after the EU referendum. 
III. ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 
Brexit has resulted in what O’Brennan describes as a “reverse 
asymmetry” of power in Anglo-Irish relations, with Dublin now 
seemingly in the ascendency for the first time ever.71 It has also 
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significantly emboldened both northern and southern variants of Irish 
nationalism, reenergizing discussions on Irish unity that were assumed 
to be largely settled under the 1998 Good Friday Agreement.72 In a 
remarkable reversal of policy, key figures in the Irish center-right have 
stated publicly that constitutional change must now be considered. For 
example, former Minister for Justice, Michael McDowell, told the BBC 
in 2017 that, “[t]en years ago I would have thought that a united Ireland 
was a very distant possibility, now I think it’s more of a real 
possibility.”73 This rupturing of Anglo-Irish relations in the wake of 
Brexit has inevitably begged questions about the depth of Britain’s 
underlying commitment to the peace process.74 Although the joint 
stewardship approach first formally enshrined in the 1985 Anglo-Irish 
Agreement by Margaret Thatcher and Garret Fitzgerald was motivated 
in large part by security considerations,75 few would question the 
sincerity of the investment in the peace process by successive British 
governments, most notably the Labour administration led by Tony 
Blair. The ease with which Brexit has diminished collective British 
memory of that investment, and the likely repercussions, is 
perplexing.76 Given the pace and complexity of the political, 
parliamentary and constitutional debates provoked by Brexit, it is 
fiendishly difficult to grasp the underlying dynamics of change. 
A generous reading of the British government’s shift in policy 
calls attention to a generational gap: only one-sixth of current 
Westminster MPs were present when the Good Friday Agreement was 
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signed in 1998.77 It also allows for a measure of naivety—the notion 
that British MPs firmly believed that the Irish question had been settled. 
Fears that a new generation of politicians underestimated the fragility 
of what had been achieved prompted former British Prime Ministers, 
John Major and Tony Blair, to travel to the Irish border to make a 
symbolic joint statement during the 2016 Brexit referendum 
campaign.78 In 2019 they were again moved to warn MPs not to 
“wreck” the peace process in Northern Ireland. Blair stated that it was 
“a shame and an outrage” that peace in Northern Ireland was being 
treated as “some disposable inconvenience to be bartered away in 
exchange for satisfying the obsession of the Brexiteers with wrenching 
our country out of Europe.”79 
A more scathing interpretation is that the more extreme Brexiteer 
members of the British government simply did not care.80 Bearing in 
mind the increasing centrality of “empire nostalgia” in pro-Brexit 
discourse discussed above, it was perhaps not too difficult to choose 
between risking the peace process in Ireland and the bilateral 
relationship with the Irish Republic and escaping from the European 
Union. In order to probe the veracity of this admittedly cynical 
assessment, it is necessary to recap on the key stages in the Anglo-Irish 
relationship, and in particular, on the role of the European Union 
therein. 
There is a general consensus that Anglo-Irish relations in the 
decades following partition were largely characterized by a “failure of 
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mutual comprehension” and the capacity to “generate mutual 
mistrust.”81 By the time the “modernizer,” Sean Lemass, came to 
power as Taoiseach in 1959 much of the heat had gone out of the “burn 
everything British except their coal” attitude that underscored the 
“Economic War” of 1932 to 1938. Heralding a new approach to the 
issue of partition, Lemass declared in 1963 that, “[w]e see our task now 
as reuniting the Irish people, as well as reuniting Irish territory.”82 With 
the outbreak of widespread violence in 1968, however, the fundamental 
fragility of both the North-South and Anglo-Irish relationship was laid 
bare. Television footage of nationalists being driven out of their homes 
in the “Battle of the Bogside” in Derry in August 1969 enraged 
moderate opinion in the South and brought increasing pressure to bear 
on Lemass’s successor, Jack Lynch. In an effort to demonstrate that he 
would no longer “stand by” as Northern nationalists and civil rights 
activists were attacked by both loyalists and the police, Lynch 
requested an urgent meeting of the United Nations Security Council.83 
This, together with a disputation of the UK claim to domestic 
jurisdiction in Northern Ireland by his Minister for Foreign Affairs, not 
surprisingly gave rise to a series of barbed exchanges with British 
counterparts.84 Escalating violence, internment and the imposition of 
direct rule all contributed to a further deterioration of diplomatic 
relations. The impact of common membership of the EEC became all 
the more significant in light of these strains on Anglo-Irish relations.85 
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Ireland and the United Kingdom joined the European Common 
Market together in 1973. Former British Prime Ministers, Irish 
Taoisigh, foreign ministers and senior officials have all stressed the 
importance of the European framework in the evolution and 
normalization of British/Irish relations and, in particular, in embedding 
a notion of “joint stewardship” of the NI peace process.86 Ireland now 
had a seat on the nine-strong Council of Ministers on an equal footing 
with Britain and, for the first time since 1949, Irish and British 
ministers, civil servants, and key figures in business, agriculture and 
trade unions converged together in Brussels.  
There were at least three practical manifestations of the maturing 
of the Anglo-Irish relationship. In economic terms, the opening up of 
European markets and the cushioning effect of targeted subsidies 
gradually lessened the economic dependency of Ireland on Britain that 
had persisted since independence and enabled the Irish government to 
move into a more confident phase of the political relationship.87 
Secondly, the very fact that a cross-section of civil servants and 
politicians now had cause to co-operate on issues such as education, 
the environment and agriculture enabled the development of important 
relationships. Theorists of negotiation have long since acknowledged 
the centrality of individual personalities and interpersonal relations.88 
In the context of the peace process, it is, for example, significant that 
two of its key architects, future Irish Taoiseach, Albert Reynolds, and 
future British Prime Minister, John Major, first become acquainted 
through bi-lateral European meetings when Major was the British 
Chancellor of the Exchequer and Reynolds was Irish Minister for 
Finance. Thirdly, the fact that European meetings provided 
opportunities to meet at some physical remove from domestic 
parliaments was also significant. In his seminal study of symbolic 
politics, Edelman notes that political settings are often plotted and 
manipulated to ensure a departure from quotidian political pressures. 
In particular, he notes that the gravity of the political setting and the 
dramaturgical features of negotiation are important in terms of future 
 
86. See for example, Martin Mansergh, The New Context of British-Irish Relations in 
IRELAND IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 97 (Ben Tonra & Eilís Ward eds. 2002). 
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legitimization with wider audiences.89 Over time, meetings at EU 
summits and the like provided opportunities for separate bilateral 
discussions on peace process-related matters between the British Prime 
Minister, Irish Taoiseach and other senior politicians and officials. This 
developed into what the current Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs has 
characterized as “a habit of cooperation.”90 
It is important to acknowledge that Anglo-Irish relations in the 
post-EU membership era were hardly problem free. Issues such as 
cross-border security, extradition, and alleged collusion between the 
security forces and loyalist and republican paramilitaries all created 
serious tensions in the relationship. However, the overall gravitational 
pull was always to return to negotiation and respectful co-operation on 
issues of mutual concern.91 In contrast to the heated exchanges of the 
late 1960s and early 70s, officials in Dublin and London developed 
guarded interpersonal trust and an ever-expanding portfolio of 
collaboration. 
In particular, the British developed a deeper understanding of the 
threat that the northern conflict posed to the southern state. This is 
reflected in the fact that, until the early 1990s, all major Anglo-Irish 
efforts to reach a settlement were premised on the acceptance of a 
common enemy (the IRA) and the related principle of refusing to 
negotiate with paramilitaries.92 Secret talks were of course proceeding 
behind the scenes (the British held discussions with republicans in 1972 
and 1975 and thereafter maintained a secret channel) but, although the 
unveiling of these negotiations rattled relations, the fundamental 
principle of joint stewardship of the peace process carried forth into the 
Good Friday Agreement of 1998. 
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The blossoming of the Anglo-Irish relationship in the decades 
after 1998 was reflected in numerous grand gestures, not least the visit 
of Queen Elizabeth to Dublin Castle in May 2011. In stark contrast to 
the angry exchanges of the late 1960s, she celebrated “the ties between 
our people, the shared values, and the economic, business and cultural 
links that make us so much more than just neighbors, that make us firm 
friends and equal partners.”93 The Irish President Mary McAleese in 
turn noted that the importance of the British and Irish governments 
“deepening engagement as equal partners in the European Union” in 
improving relations.94 
In spite of the apparent depth of and firmness of this friendship 
and trust, it is clear that Brexit has succeeded in driving a wedge 
between Britain and Ireland, at the level of politics, diplomacy and civil 
society.95 On the face of it, all of the key actors stress their ongoing 
commitment to the Good Friday Agreement and the peace process. 
Throughout the Brexit campaign, the Irish government has made clear 
its profound concerns regarding the potential impact on peace.96 Albeit 
less forcefully, senior British politicians and officials have also voiced 
concern for the peace process and pledge to honor commitments made 
in 1998. For example, in her March 29 letter triggering Article 50, then 
Prime Minister, Theresa May, acknowledged her responsibility to 
“make sure that nothing is done to jeopardize the peace process in 
Northern Ireland, and to continue to uphold the Belfast Agreement.”97 
Such statements have, however, proved increasingly incompatible with 
parallel commitments to prioritize “global Britain” and “get Brexit 
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done.”98 We have noted above that there is a growing consensus that a 
resurgence of English nationalism is at the heart of the issue and we 
considered the root cause of this in light of various facets of empire 
nostalgia.99 A key related question in the context of Anglo-Irish 
relations and the Irish peace process concerns the extent to which 
Brexit unmasked an essentially superficial commitment to peace on the 
part of the British state. 
A classical realist perspective on the current British government’s 
apparent disregard for the Good Friday Agreement would suggest that 
there is nothing particularly surprising in the realignment of state policy 
in line with state interests.100 Viewed in this light, it is logical that, 
when the concerns of the Irish peace process chimed with Britain’s 
security, economic and political concerns, it assumed joint custody. 
Later, as noted above, when the need to satisfy the demands to “get 
Brexit done” jarred with these commitments, the Irish peace process 
was reassigned to the “tail of the dog.”101 It is important to note that the 
Irish government’s recent pronouncements on Irish unity can also be 
viewed through the prism of what (to paraphrase James C. Scott) might 
be dubbed as “seeing like a state.”102 Thus, for example, when the Irish 
Republican Army’s campaign was deemed to threaten peace and 
security in the Republic, government policy was resolutely anti-Sinn 
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Féin—with the Irish government maintaining a much tougher line than 
their British counterparts on the issue of “talking to terrorists.”103 
Arguably what has changed in the context of Brexit is that the Irish 
state’s economic and political priorities now align more closely with 
the prospect of a united Ireland than with partition. 
Whilst state-centric impulses may go some way towards 
explaining the current state of Anglo-Irish relations, they do not 
adequately account for the scale of the vitriol that has been unleashed. 
As the Irish government, buoyed up by its allies in Europe, dug in its 
heels and held firm in the Brexit negotiations, a torrent of anti-Irish 
sentiment was unleashed. David Yelland, a former editor of the 
famously nationalistic British tabloid newspaper, The Sun, tweeted in 
July 2019: 
I’ve been shocked at two dinners recently when Tories of influence 
have told me privately “Varadkar isn’t bright” and “the Irish will 
blink” and it seems, amazingly, that this is the actual policy of 
HMG under Johnson. They are anti-Irish, arrogant, dangerous and 
wrong.104 
Regardless of the source of such views, Brexit has undoubtedly 
placed a considerable strain on carefully nurtured relationships 
between the British and Irish governments. It remains the publicly 
stated desire of both governments to protect this relationship but a key 
challenge will be to either devise new mechanisms or improve or 
rejuvenate existing structures to ensure that the “habit of [Anglo-Irish] 
cooperation” and a shared sense of responsibility are maintained during 
and after Brexit.105 We have considered thus far the ways in which EU 
membership indirectly facilitated Anglo-Irish co-operation and the 
advancement of peace in Northern Ireland. In the next section, we 
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consider in more detail the European Union’s direct involvement in the 
peace process before and after the Brexit referendum. 
IV. THE EU AND THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS 
Besides facilitating Anglo-Irish cooperation in the emerging 
peace process, the European Union in time became a direct contributor. 
The origins of direct EU engagement in the NI peace process can be 
traced at least to the late 1970s. In 1979 then the leader of the Social 
and Democratic Labour Party (“SDLP”), John Hume, encouraged the 
European Parliament to produce a report on the NI conflict.106 The 
document called for a coordinated British-Irish approach—a 
forerunner of the joint stewardship principle that underpinned all 
subsequent peace agreements. Indeed the Anglo-Irish Agreement—
which provided the template for precisely such a joint approach—
referred to the EEC in its preamble and drew significantly from the 
language, findings, and recommendations of the Haagerup Report.107 
Following the signing of the Agreement both the European Parliament 
and the Council of the European Union formally congratulated the two 
governments on the achievement. To further underline their support, 
the European Union contributed fifteen million European Currency 
Units (“ECUs”) (the forerunner to the Euro) in 1989 to the International 
Fund for Ireland which was established as a result of the Agreement.108 
As Moxon Browne, Hayward and Murphy, and others have 
argued, the “European dimension” internationalized and legitimized 
the joint British approach to the conflict in Northern Ireland and made 
it more difficult for either party to attempt to “go solo” on peace 
process-related matters.109 The 1993 Downing Street Declaration 
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signed by John Major and Albert Reynolds, which paved the way for 
the IRA and loyalist ceasefires in 1994, states “the development of 
Europe will, of itself, require new approaches to serve interests 
common to both parts of the island of Ireland, and to Ireland and the 
United Kingdom as partners in the European Union.”110 Following the 
ceasefires, the 1995 Framework for Agreement produced by the two 
governments made even more significant reference to the importance 
of the “European dimension” as a template for enabling the evolving 
peace process.111 In addition, as discussed further below, the 1998 
Good Friday Agreement made explicit reference to the European 
Union as reflected both in the terms of cooperation in the international 
treaty signed by the British and Irish governments and in the working 
of the North South Ministerial Council between Northern Ireland and 
the Republic.112 
Mindful of the political sensitivities involved in being seen to 
“interfere,” the key thrust of EU policy has been to emphasize the link 
between improved social and economic conditions and the momentum 
towards peace. The original peace funding program—launched in 1994 
by European Commission President Jacque Delors—stated that it was 
important to “convince those on the ground that the peace process can 
yield real dividends to their lives.”113 Since then, the financial 
contribution from the European Union to Northern Ireland and the 
border counties has been substantial. In addition to several European 
Structural and Investment Programs, there have been three EU Peace 
and Reconciliation (“PEACE”) programs—involving a financial 
contribution of EUR€1.3 billion from the European Union and the 
British and Irish governments.114 A fourth program (“PEACE IV”) was 
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launched in January 2016—with a total value of EUR€270 million.115 
These programs are broadly aimed at ensuring “cohesion between 
communities involved in the conflict in Northern Ireland and the border 
counties of Ireland; [and] economic and social stability.”116 They have 
funded investment programs, cross-community and cross-border 
initiatives, urban and rural regeneration schemes, shared spaces and 
services, and initiatives designed to nurture positive relations at a local 
level.117 Additionally, the border regions in Northern Ireland and the 
Republic of Ireland have benefitted from the EU INTERREG program. 
This aims to support “cross-border co-operation for a more prosperous 
and sustainable region,” by addressing “the economic and social 
problems resulting from the existence of borders”.118 Since 1991, 
EUR€1.13 billion has come into the Border region as a result of this 
program and the INTERREG VA Program for 2014-2020 is worth 
EUR€283 million.119 
Given the scale of its investment to date, it is not surprising that 
EU officials have expressed concern about the potential impact of 
Brexit on the peace process. In a joint press conference with Taoiseach 
Leo Varadkar in March 2018, the President of the European Council, 
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must be avoided at all costs.”120 The chief Brexit negotiator for the 
European Union, Michel Barnier, has been equally resolute on the need 
to safeguard the peace process and in particular the key tenets of the 
Good Friday Agreement. In May 2017, he offered reassurance that 
“nothing should put peace at risk” in the upcoming negotiations with 
the UK.121 Indeed, the European Commission Brexit Negotiation Task 
Force included in its guiding principles a commitment to protect “the 
gains of the peace process and of the Good Friday Agreement.”122 
The European Commission has also pledged to continue funding 
“cross-border programmes supporting peace and reconciliation”123 in 
spite of Brexit, proposing to contribute EUR€120 million between 
2021-2027—if mechanisms for appropriate matching monies can be 
agreed with the UK and Irish governments.124 Whilst there has been a 
general commitment on the part of the United Kingdom to “match” 
funding levels previously delivered across the United Kingdom by EU 
programs, little detail has been provided with regard to Northern 
Ireland-specific peace funding. In an article published in the mainly 
nationalist newspaper The Irish News, then British Prime Minister 
Theresa May stated that “there may be specific and valuable EU 
programmes (including peace funding in Northern Ireland) for which 
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we want to agree continuation of funding,” but the current British 
government has to date refrained from making a firm commitment to 
cover the direct costs of all such projects.125 It thus seems likely that 
these programs would have to compete for UK budget funds with key 
areas such as health and education.126 
In sum, the involvement of the European Union (formerly EEC) 
has been a given in the evolving peace process in Northern Ireland. 
Indeed, that axiom—the “European dimension”—became an important 
component in the language and context of all of the major peace 
process-related papers from the Anglo-Irish Agreement (1985) until the 
Good Friday Agreement (1998). Underpinning this commitment to the 
political process, the EU has invested heavily in peace funding for 
Northern Ireland and the border regions of the Republic of Ireland. 
Whether or not the British government will uphold this very significant 
financial contribution in the aftermath of Brexit remains uncertain. The 
real challenge will be when hard choices need to be made, particularly 
on the part of the UK government, between policies that will have a 
direct and deleterious effect on the peace process and the type of Brexit 
arrangements they seek to implement. Such hard choices will have the 
most obvious impact within Northern Ireland itself and it is that subject 
to which we now turn. 
V. BREXIT, POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS AND IDENTITY 
POLITICS IN NORTHERN IRELAND 
The UK referendum result in favor of Brexit has had quite 
profound implications for political relationships in Northern Ireland 
given that fifty-six percent of the electorate there voted to remain in the 
European Union.127 The voting pattern within Northern Ireland reveals 
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a clear ethnonational divide.128 Catholics overwhelmingly voted to 
remain by a proportion of 85% to 15% whilst Protestants voted to leave 
by a proportion of 60% to 40%;129 correspondingly, “two-thirds of self-
described ‘unionists’ voted to leave, while almost 90% of self-
described ‘nationalists’ voted to remain”.130 In such a context, as 
Gormley-Heenan and Aughey have argued, the referendum result “was 
bound to be taken as a victory for one community at the expense of the 
other.”131 There were other issues involved in the decision by Sinn Féin 
to collapse the Northern Ireland Executive and Assembly in January 
2017 but, then Deputy First Minister, Martin McGuinness, made clear 
in his resignation letter that Brexit was a contributing factor.132 
Moreover, the uncertainty regarding Brexit undoubtedly delayed the 
re-establishment of the power-sharing executive – which did not 
happen until January 2020. At this juncture, it may be useful to offer a 
brief synopsis of the attitudes of the main political parties in Northern 
Ireland towards Brexit and their views as to whether or not it represents 
a threat to the Good Friday Agreement and the peace process. 
The Democratic Unionist Party (“DUP”), the largest unionist 
party, remained true to their Eurosceptic tradition and supported 
Brexit.133 As noted above, having secured ten seats at Westminster in 
the 2017 general election, they entered into a “supply and demand” 
arrangement with Theresa May and became centrally important to a 
series of attempts to steer a Brexit deal through parliament.134 The party 
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has insisted that Brexit does not represent a threat to the peace process. 
For example, DUP deputy leader Nigel Dodds has argued that “to use 
the peace process as an excuse to either thwart Brexit or to shape it in 
the way some people want is quite frankly outrageous and 
disgraceful.”135 Although the DUP appeared to successfully hold first 
Theresa May and then her successor, Boris Johnson, to the pledge that 
there would be no diminution of the position of Northern Ireland within 
the United Kingdom, the deal struck between Johnson and the 
European Union in September 2019 was classed as a “hammer blow” 
and a “betrayal” by seasoned unionist commentators.136 As discussed 
elsewhere in this Article, paranoia about betrayal by the British has 
been a key feature of unionist politics since the formation of the 
state.137 The following junctures have all been regarded with suspicion 
and in some instances contempt, by Ulster unionists: the proroguing of 
Stormont in 1972, the Sunningdale Agreement 1973, the Anglo-Irish 
Agreement 1985, the Downing Street Declaration 1993 and (in the eyes 
of some within the DUP at least), the Good Friday Agreement of 
1998.138 
The smaller Ulster Unionist Party (“UUP”) opposed Brexit in the 
referendum but subsequently shifted its position, stating that it accepted 
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“the will of the British people” and that it would thus support Theresa 
May in her efforts to “get the best deal for Britain and Northern 
Ireland.”139 Following this shift of position, the UUP produced a paper 
that focused upon Northern Ireland post-Brexit.140 There was no 
explicit reference in this document to a perceived threat to the peace 
process but one UUP Member of the NI Assembly (“MLA”) 
interviewed by the authors expressed concerns about the prospect of 
dissident republican violence in the context of a hard border.141 
Both major nationalist parties in Northern Ireland have remained 
firm in their opposition to Brexit. Sinn Féin, formerly the political wing 
of the IRA and now the voice of the majority of northern nationalists, 
historically viewed increased European integration as a threat to Irish 
sovereignty.142 However, in recent years its increasingly pragmatic 
approach to the European Union was evidenced in its opposition to 
Brexit. Several Sinn Féin representatives interviewed by the authors 
were concerned to highlight what they perceived to be the grave 
implications for the peace process, adding that any hardening of the 
border would inevitably invite physical force resistance from dissident 
republicans (discussed further below).143 
The smaller of the nationalist parties, the SDLP, has always been 
a strong supporter of the EU.144 Not surprisingly, it has maintained a 
clear anti-Brexit stance. SDLP leader Colum Eastwood has been clear 
in his view that Brexit undermines the legacy of the Good Friday 
Agreement, warning that it “carries with it the potential to dismantle 
the architecture of our peace process.”145 Another SDLP MLA 
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expressed concerns that Brexit has not only emboldened republican 
dissidents but that it has “made being a part of the UK very 
uncomfortable for a lot of nationalists.” He added: “It has just put 
identity and the constitutional question right back into politics in a way 
that the Good Friday Agreement had tried to minimise for decades . . . 
it has agitated it in a very serious way.”146 
Finally, the centrist Alliance party is opposed to Brexit and has 
expressed clear concern regarding the impact of Brexit on the peace 
process. It calls for a special arrangement for Northern Ireland in order 
to protect the Good Friday Agreement. Alliance’s concerns about the 
impact of Brexit on political and intercommunal relations mirror very 
closely those expressed by the SDLP interviewee in terms of a 
perceived hardening of positions amongst both nationalists and 
unionists and the undermining of what Alliance term a “shared 
Northern Ireland.”147 This brief overview of the stance taken on Brexit 
by the five main political parties in Northern Ireland highlights a 
number of key impacts that are worthy of closer examination. In the 
following section, we explore two closely related contemporaneous 
developments—the re-energizing of identity politics and the re-
emergence of Irish unity as a live political debate. 
It would be naive to suggest that the Good Friday Agreement 
somehow dissolved identity politics in Northern Ireland. The electoral 
rise of Sinn Féin and the DUP—and their usurping of the ostensibly 
more moderate counterparts of the SDLP and UUP—suggest that the 
post-Good Friday Agreement electorate wants to be represented by the 
strongest political voices from within their two communities.148 
Indeed, the decision by then Deputy First Minister of Northern Ireland, 
Martin McGuinness, to collapse the Stormont executive was motivated 
at least in part by what he saw as the DUP’s inability to come to terms 
with expressions of Irish identity and culture including the Irish 
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language.149 That said, the peace agreement undoubtedly succeeded in 
reducing the communal focus on the constitutional question. The 
various strands of the Agreement were developed precisely to 
accommodate individuals who wished to identify as either British or 
Irish – or both / neither or indeed European – and to embed the 
complexities of both North-South and East-West relations.150 It can 
thus be argued that the Good Friday Agreement was less about 
reconciliation than “agreement to differ amid a sharing or division of 
power between the rival ethnic blocs.”151 It was this element of 
“constructive ambiguity” that allowed both sides to claim that they 
were successfully “working” the deal and “transforming Northern 
Ireland.”152 As Bell and Cavanaugh argue, “each side knows that it is a 
‘fudge’ but can live with it, and ‘sell’ it to their own constituents as 
victory, or at least not a defeat.”153 
Todd suggests that the combination of the Good Friday 
Agreement, devolution, the opening up of the border, the development 
of key institutions such as the Special EU Programmes Body (SEUPB) 
and the North South Ministerial Council, and the myriad benefits of 
mutual British and Irish EU membership combined to diminish the 
extent to which British sovereignty shaped the cultural identification 
and constitutional allegiance of nationalists.154 These factors managed 
to secure the assent of pragmatists within northern nationalism—
people who were willing to live in Northern Ireland as part of the 
United Kingdom “ . . . so long as their rights are respected and they 
have a secure sense of identity, but with no emotional or sentimental 
attachment to either Britishness or to the political institutions of the 
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United Kingdom.”155 Although many unionists struggled with the 
reality of seeing Sinn Féin in government, fears gradually eased as the 
IRA proceeded to decommission its weapons and (for the most part) 
exited the stage. The return (albeit intermittently) of power to Stormont 
was also welcomed by unionists and the fact that initial fears that the 
North South Ministerial Council (a key feature of the Good Friday 
Agreement) would become a “Trojan horse” to reunification proved 
unfounded combined to broadly reassure most that the union with Great 
Britain and British identity for unionists, whilst requiring constant 
vigilance, was secure. 156 One UUP MLA summed up well the impact 
of Brexit on many northern nationalists’ identity: 
Their perception post the Brexit referendum of this was that 
English nationalists had come in over their heads and denied that 
part of their identity which was critical to them feeling comfortable 
about living here.157 
In addition, for some interviewees, the loss of a sense of 
“Europeanness” was acutely felt. This issue was to the fore in our 
public meetings with young people, with respondents emphasizing that 
they welcomed their European identity as a means of avoiding having 
to identify themselves as either British or Irish.158 
VI. BREXIT AND THE “MAINSTREAMING” OF IRISH 
REUNIFICATION 
The other closely related impact of Brexit has been the energizing 
of debates on the prospect of a united Ireland. Since the Brexit 
referendum, this issue has moved center-stage, attracting a level of 
scrutiny on both parts of the island not seen since the time of partition. 
Although reunification was the formal position of all of the nationalist 
parties in Ireland prior to the Brexit referendum, in reality it was not a 
major priority for any of them with the exception of Sinn Féin.159 As 
noted above, since Brexit, there has been a discernible sea-change in 
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attitudes towards a united Ireland.160 At the MacGill Summer School 
in July 2016 then Taoiseach Enda Kenny stated that, in relation to the 
upcoming Brexit negotiations, the EU needs to prepare for a United 
Ireland.161 The Fine Gael led government in the Republic successfully 
argued for the inclusion of provisions in the EU negotiations guidelines 
to permit Northern Ireland to re-join the European Union as part of a 
united Ireland162 In August 2017, a cross-party parliamentary 
committee in the Dáil endorsed a 450pp report detailing how a united 
Ireland by consent could be achieved in light of Brexit.163 
Although unionists have not surprisingly rejected calls for a 
border poll on Irish unity, it is notable that even some members of the 
DUP have reluctantly accepted that the issue is unlikely to go away. In 
2018 former NI First Minister and DUP leader, Peter Robinson, 
suggested that, in light of the Brexit referendum and its aftermath, 
“generational border polls” would be ‘‘the least divisive and 
disruptive” means to address the question of a united Ireland.164 
Certainly, for those within the business community, the prospect of 
disruption to trade and economic wellbeing has caused many to re-
examine their political compass. A UUP MLA told us: “Well, for the 
first time I’ve had friends who would be unionists but are business 
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people who trade with Dublin, with the Republic, just asking the 
question, ‘what would be wrong with a united Ireland?’”165 
Two recent polls conducted in Northern Ireland suggest that 
Catholic support for a united Ireland would increase in the event that 
the United Kingdom leaves the EU Customs Union and Single market 
and, in particular, in the context of a “hard border” being imposed on 
the island.166 Spurred on by this apparent change in public opinion, key 
figures in northern nationalism have come together in a group titled 
“Ireland’s Future” to campaign and lobby for serious debate on 
constitutional change on the island of Ireland.167 Whatever the 
reliability of competing polls, as the intervention of Peter Robinson 
illustrates, discussion on a united Ireland is now a firmly established 
element of political discourse across the island. The prominence given 
to these debates has not surprisingly had an unsettling effect within 
(largely pro-Brexit) working-class loyalist communities. 
Some unionist and conservative politicians have warned that the 
Irish government “saying silly things about the border and the 
constitutional issues” could provoke a violent reaction from Loyalist 
paramilitaries.168 Whilst loyalist leaders have to date exercised a degree 
of cautious restraint with regard to such threats, as is discussed further 
below, some individuals within their ranks have clearly been alarmed 
both by debates on Irish unity and the apparent “betrayal” inherent in 
the 2019 iteration of the Withdrawal Agreement. 
 
165. BREXITLAWNI, supra note 146, at 24 (quoting BrexitLawNI interview with UUP 
MLA, Belfast, Jan. 9, 2018). 
166. See John Garry et al, What do People in Northern Ireland Think About Brexit? In 
BREXIT AND THE ISLAND OF IRELAND 5, 7, available at http://ukandeu.ac.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2018/05/Brexit-and-Island-of-Ireland.pdf [https://perma.cc/JAZ3-97VN]. See 
also Gerry Moriarty, Brexit Would Boost Support for a United Ireland, IRISH TIMES (Sept. 3, 
2018), https://www.irishtimes.com/news/ireland/irish-news/brexit-would-boost-support-for-
united-ireland-poll-finds-1.3616129 [https://perma.cc/5FKX-3DTP]. 
167.  Freya McClements, Open Letter Began With “Recurring Theme” Around Denial of 
Rights in North: Brexit “Changed Everything” and Dialogue on Reunification of Ireland now 
“Centre Stage”, IRISH TIMES (Nov. 4, 2019) https://www.irishtimes.com/news/ireland/irish-
news/open-letter-began-with-recurring-theme-around-denial-of-rights-in-north-1.4071181 
[https://perma.cc/ FC7C-XQNE]. 
168.  Henry McDonald, David Trimble: Ireland Risks Provoking Paramilitaries Over Post 
Brexit Border, GUARDIAN (Apr. 6, 2018), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/06/david-trimble-ireland-risks-provoking-
paramilitaries-over-post-brexit-border [https://perma.cc/95AC-P966]. Fiach Kelly, Simon 
Carswell, & Steven McCaffrey, Government Rejects Trimble’s Warnings Over its Brexit Stance, 
IRISH TIMES (Apr. 7, 2018), https://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/government-rejects-
trimble-s-warnings-over-its-brexit-stance-1.3453289 [https://perma.cc/2HAP-5WNR]. 
646 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 43:3 
In sum, despite the strong advocacy of the largest unionist party 
in Northern Ireland (the DUP) for Brexit, one clear consequence of the 
Brexit referendum result has been the increased prominence of the 
issue of Irish reunification. This reflects significant levels of anger on 
the part of northern nationalists, shifts in attitudes amongst politicians 
in the Republic, and acceptance at least on the part of some elements 
within the unionist community that the issue requires “contingency 
planning.”169 Given the seriousness of the consequences should 
discontent provoked by Brexit spill over into civil disobedience and 
violence, we now examine more closely the scale of that threat. 
VII. BREXIT, POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND THE GOVERNANCE 
OF SECURITY 
In this Part, we focus primarily on the risks presented by dissident 
republicans as this has been the primary preoccupation of government 
and security experts. In light of the loyalist reaction to the most recent 
agreement between the British government and the European Union, 
we also consider the likely impact on that community before turning to 
examine the challenge of responding to such threats on both sides of 
the Irish border. These are of course complicated by Brexit given the 
centrality of the European Union to the governance and regulation of 
security. Before exploring these contemporary security concerns, it is 
necessary to provide some background on the relevant groups, their 
history and capacity for violence, levels of community support and the 
symbolic importance of borders within and between Ireland and 
Britain. 
The twentieth-century variants of Irish republicanism typically 
trace their origins to a series of unsuccessful armed uprisings from 1798 
onwards. The best known of these was the Easter Rising of 1916. 
Although it failed militarily, the execution of the leaders and mass 
imprisonment that followed, galvanized anti-British sentiment in 
Ireland and laid the foundations for the Irish War of Independence 
(1919-21).170 Since the 1920s different republican groupings—
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particularly variants of the Irish Republican Army (IRA)—have 
engaged in what they term “armed struggle against British occupation 
in Ireland.”171 Following the War of Independence and the ensuing 
negotiations and Anglo-Irish Treaty, the island of Ireland was 
partitioned into the Irish Free State (granted self-government over 26 
counties albeit within the ambit of the British Empire) and Northern 
Ireland (comprising the six north-eastern counties). The partition of 
Ireland subsequently became the primary focus for republican armed 
struggle. Their efforts include the bombing campaign in England 
(1939-40), the “Border Campaign” (1958-62), and the more 
widespread guerrilla warfare campaign of 1969-1994.172 
In common with all political movements, the fusing, splitting, and 
realignment of allegiances has been an enduring feature of Irish 
republicanism.173 Given that long history of often violent schisms, the 
republican leadership expended considerable energy from the 1990s 
onwards on managing their constituency in an effort to minimize the 
risks of splinter organizations emerging to undermine the peace 
process.174 Whilst that strategy was largely successful, a small cohort 
remained fundamentally opposed to the cessation of the campaign of 
political violence. That cohort has in turn sub-divided but the term 
“dissident republican” is employed collectively to refer to those 
republican groupings who disagree with the peace strategy being 
advanced by Sinn Féin and the mainstream republican movement. It 
includes those who support the continuation of an armed campaign and 
those who reject violence but express political opposition to the Sinn 
Féin’s republican strategy.175 
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In general, dissident republicans regard the Sinn Féin peace 
strategy as a “sell-out” and a betrayal of the sacrifices of past 
generations of republicans.176 The three most prominent “dissident” 
groups are the Real IRA (“RIRA”), the Continuity IRA (“CIRA”) and 
Óglaigh na hÉireann (“ONH”). The smaller republican vigilante group, 
Republican Action Against Drugs (“RAAD”) voted in 2012 to merge 
with the Real IRA (“RIRA”) to form what is often referred to by 
journalists as the New IRA. 177 In 2017 a new dissident group calling 
itself Arm na Poblachta (“Army of the Republic”) claimed 
responsibility for a roadside explosive device in Belfast. In the twenty 
years since the signing of the Good Friday Agreement, more than fifty 
people have been killed by these various dissident republican 
organizations.178 Twenty-nine people died and over 200 were injured 
in one incident when the Real IRA detonated a bomb in the center of 
Omagh, Co. Tyrone, in 1998. This provoked widespread condemnation 
and led the British and Irish governments to introduce additional anti-
terrorism legislation designed to counter the organization.179 The 
organization’s capacity was significantly reduced in the aftermath of 
Omagh but sporadic fatal attacks against police, army and prison 
personnel persisted. Between 2009 and 2019, dissidents were 
responsible for the deaths of two PSNI officers, two British soldiers, 
two prison officers and a journalist.180 MI5 continue to classify the 
threat from dissident republicans as “severe” meaning that an attack is 
highly likely.181 
It is important to stress that the capacity of these groups to engage 
in violence is significantly less than their Provisional IRA 
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predecessors. All dissident groups are heavily monitored by the police 
and security services—a task made easier by their much smaller size 
and relatively low level of community support.182 It would nonetheless 
be foolish to dismiss the potential for increased republican dissident 
violence as a result of Brexit. It is also important to remember that, 
historically, widespread popular support has not been a pre-requisite 
for armed republican action in Ireland. For example, the IRA had been 
reduced to a very small cadre of committed activists in the aftermath of 
the Second World War but this did not preclude a resurgence of the 
organization in the 1950s.183 Interestingly, some of the republicans 
interviewed by the authors highlighted the IRA “Border Campaign” of 
“by way of caution against dismissing the potential threat of dissident 
republicanism post-Brexit”.184 
Most dissident republican groups supported Brexit in the belief 
that the European Union represents the interests of capital rather than 
working-class people and that it infringes on Irish sovereignty.185 In 
particular, as the authors have previously argued: 
Brexit is broadly viewed [by dissident republicans] as ideological 
confirmation of Britain’s imperialist attitude and a classic example 
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of the usurpation of Ireland’s right to sovereignty and self-
determination.186 
In view of the fact that Brexit is proceeding against the wishes of 
the majority of people in Ireland, North and South, one life-long 
republican suggested that it is: “[t]he embodiment of Britain’s colonial 
mindset towards Ireland, ignoring what the Irish people want, or what 
is in the interests of the Irish people and simply pursuing their own 
selfish and strategic interest which is based on narrow British 
jingoism”.187 “Invoking an age-old republican dictum,” a leading 
dissident republican told the authors that “from a republican 
perspective, we always look at England’s disadvantage as our 
advantage.”188 Although he was personally skeptical about the benefits 
of EU membership he explained that: “You are getting to the point 
where you don’t care what happens as long as Britain breaks up, or the 
union breaks up [ . . . ] we will take national sovereignty whatever way 
it comes to us.” He thus delighted in what he viewed as the “marred 
swamp of British constitutional politics” since the Brexit vote and 
adding that, “everybody is just sitting waiting for the so-called ‘United 
Kingdom’ to implode.”189 
The most welcome aspect of Brexit from a dissident republican 
perspective is the spotlight that it has placed on the existence of the 
border. A spokesperson for the dissident group, Saoradh, suggested that 
Brexit had exposed “ . . . what basically has been since 1998 a soft 
occupation in the North.” 190 This, in his view, was “manna from 
heaven.”191 When questioned about the views of republican dissidents 
on the respective merits of a “hard” versus “soft” Brexit, he suggested, 
“the harder the better.”192 In particular, he noted that any kind of 
military presence or infrastructure on the Irish border would be “highly 
antagonistic” to Irish republicans.193 
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Amongst the interviews carried out by the authors with 
republicans (including dissident republicans) in border areas in 
Northern Ireland, there was widespread consensus that Brexit and the 
prospect of a hard border, in particular, would indeed be a potential 
mobilizing agent for not only protest and violence but also illegal 
smuggling activities. Other studies suggest that there would be 
increased support for violence in the nationalist community well 
beyond the border regions in the event of a hard border.194 This latter 
risk—of Brexit radicalizing previously mainstream nationalists—was 
raised by a veteran Provisional IRA leader and now senior Sinn Fein 
member who is widely respected for his work in implementing the 
peace process. He told the authors: 
I am less worried by the dissidents than I am about mainstream 
republicans, particularly a new generation of younger republicans 
and how they will react if there is some form of a hard border. This 
may become a serious challenge for us [mainstream republican 
leaders] trying to stop people reacting to this.195 
Fears of a potential security risk in the event of a hard border are 
clearly shared by the Police Service of Northern Ireland (“PSNI”). In 
May 2018 then Chief Constable, Sir George Hamilton, announced that 
a business case was being drawn up to fund the recruitment of up to 
four hundred additional officers to serve along the Irish border.196 Mr. 
Hamilton explained that he needed to ensure that his organization was 
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“match fit” for the post-Brexit era.197 More recently, his successor 
Simon Byrne told the Guardian newspaper that, “We are very clear 
here. We do not support the establishment of checkpoints or monitoring 
cameras right near the border and we’d be very reluctant to be drawn 
there because of the threat to our officers.”198 
While much of the focus since Brexit has been on the risk posed 
by dissident republicans, political developments since the details of the 
proposed Johnson deal with the EU in 2019 have concentrated attention 
on the possibility of violence or civil disobedience emanating from 
loyalist sources. By way of background, loyalist paramilitaries carried 
out a violent campaign in support of the maintenance of the union with 
Britain and the perceived failure of the government to deal effectively 
with Republican “terrorism.”199 The main loyalist paramilitary 
groupings are the Ulster Defence Association (“UDA”) (also 
sometimes referred to as the Ulster Freedom Fighters), the Ulster 
Volunteer Force (“UVF”), the Red Hand Commando (“RHC”) and the 
now-defunct splinter group, the Loyalist Volunteer Force (“LVF”).200 
Their targets were traditionally uninvolved Catholic civilians, 
economic or civilian targets in the Irish Republic and republican 
activists.201 Regarding themselves as primarily defensive in nature, 
they consider that they were driven to the use of political violence by 
the IRA, defending not only the link with the United Kingdom but also 
their own community from republican violence.202 
Whilst the major loyalist organizations announced a ceasefire in 
1994, they (in common with their republican counterparts) have 
continued to be involved in political violence.203 Much of that violence 
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has been directed inwards at other loyalists.204 There have been 
conspicuous acts of political leadership by individual loyalists but the 
three main loyalist organizations have also been heavily involved in 
criminal activity including drug dealing, extortion and robberies.205 
While Sinn Féin has emerged as the largest nationalist political party, 
the political wings of the two largest loyalist paramilitary organizations 
(the Progressive Unionist Party and the Ulster Democratic Party) failed 
to make significant electoral inroads after the Good Friday 
Agreement.206 As pro-state paramilitary groups, Loyalist have had an 
ambivalent relationship with that state, often expressed as a strong 
sense that their “loyalty to queen and country” is insufficiently 
recognized.207 In addition, there is a deep-seated fear within both 
loyalist and unionist politics and culture that they are always vulnerable 
to betrayal by the British.208 This has, as noted, been inflamed by Boris 
Johnson’s recent apparent U-turn on the question of a trade border 
along the Irish sea.209 Unsurprisingly, unionist politicians and some 
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loyalist paramilitaries have decried this act as part of the “slippery 
slope” towards a united Ireland.210 Hundreds of loyalists (including 
prominent paramilitaries) have attended public meetings on the “great 
betrayal,” and one prominent activist has claimed there will be “mass 
resistance” if the deal is enacted.211 While there is some evidence of 
other senior loyalists exercising a restraining influence, the PSNI Chief 
Constable has indicated that (in a mirror image of nationalist anger 
towards any hard border) “you can anticipate a lot of emotion in loyalist 
communities and the potential for civil disorder.”212 
Regardless of the source, Brexit has presented a number of legal 
and practical problems for the governance of security in Northern 
Ireland and between Northern Ireland and the Republic. In particular, 
many aspects of cross-border cooperation between police and security 
agencies in the two jurisdictions have been done through the EU 
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regulatory framework.213 A key challenge identified by police and 
security professionals was the insistence from the UK government that 
ending the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(“CJEU”)—the EU’s supreme judicial authority—was a “red line” 
issue.214 Given that all security related disputes on the interpretation of 
the EU framework are ultimately resolved by the CJEU, this presents a 
serious problem for security and policing officials. While this position 
appeared to soften slightly with the 2019 EU Withdrawal Agreement, 
there has been no fundamental change in relation to justice and security 
issues. Under Article 89 of that Agreement, the jurisdiction of the 
CJEU persists throughout the transition period, but it (largely) ends 
thereafter. For eight years following the transition period, UK courts 
will only be able to send cases to the CJEU if they concern EU citizens 
living in the United Kingdom,215 or if they relate to some of the 
protocols on Northern Ireland and Cyprus.216 The CJEU will not have 
jurisdiction for justice and security matters. 
By way of illustration of the practical and legal challenges 
involved, the European Arrest Warrant (“EAW”) facilitates the 
extradition of individuals between EU member states, including 
between the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom. This legal 
framework, which has operated since 2004, has no provisions for third-
country membership, meaning that the United Kingdom is very 
unlikely to be able to remain within it after it leaves the European 
Union.217 The loss of the EAW is a particularly important issue in the 
context of the relationship between the United Kingdom and Ireland, 
and more specifically, between Northern Ireland and the Republic of 
Ireland. Historically, extraditions were a source of significant tension 
between the Republic and the United Kingdom resulting in multiple 
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time-consuming and expensive legal challenges.218 The introduction of 
the EAW shifted the focus away from bilateral arrangements between 
the British and Irish states to an EU one, reducing the political 
sensitivities and making the process much more efficient and less 
costly. Whereas previously extradition cases were sometimes held up 
for years in the Irish courts, the average extradition time under the 
EAW has been reduced to 48 days.219 The Chief Constable of the PSNI 
has warned that the EAW is “critical” in its efforts to counter crime and 
terrorism,220 a fact also acknowledged by the former UK Prime 
Minister Theresa May,221 the Irish Minister for Justice, Charlie 
Flanagan,222 and the head of the police in the Republic.223 
Similarly, data sharing between policing, security, and 
prosecution officials via EU databases is premised on EU 
 
218. See generally MICHAEL FARRELL, SHELTERING THE FUGITIVE: THE EXTRADITION 
OF IRISH POLITICAL OFFENDERS (1985); Colm Campbell, Extradition to Northern Ireland: 
Prospects and Problems, 52 MODERN L. REV. 585 (1989); Kieran McEvoy, Law, Struggle, and 
Political Transformation in Northern Ireland, 27 J. OF L. AND SOCIETY 542 (2000). 
219. Kramer et al supra note 218, at 4. 
220. Mark Bain, Brexit: Northern Ireland Security at Risk if UK Kicked Out of EU 
Extradition System, Warns Police Chief, BELFAST TELEGRAPH (June 20, 2018) 
https://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/brexit-northern-ireland-security-at-
risk-if-uk-kicked-out-of-eu-extradition-system-warns-police-chief-37029094.html 
[https://perma.cc/PVK5-S8UW]. EUROPEAN UNION COMMITTEE, BREXIT: THE 
PROPOSED UK-EU SECURITY TREATY, 2017-2019, HL 164 (UK) at 165. 
221. Philip Oltermann, Theresa May Wants New Security Treaty With EU Next Year, 
GUARDIAN (Feb. 17 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/feb/17/theresa-may-
wants-new-security-treaty-with-eu-next-year [https://perma.cc/X43F-5N2Z]. Tim Shipman, 
Brexit: Theresa May Pledges to Keep EU Arrest Warrant and Europol Links, TIMES (Feb.11, 
2018), https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/theresa-may-pledges-to-keep-eu-arrest-warrant-and-
europol-links-lj2pkx6lg [https://perma.cc/KRG4-Y3K2]. 
222. Barry Roche, Flanagan Urges UK to Maintain Extradition Arrangements Post-
Brexit, IRISH TIMES (Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.irishtimes.com/news/ireland/irish-
news/flanagan-urges-uk-to-maintain-extradition-arrangements-post-brexit-1.3797165 [DNV8-
E9N4]. Ralph Riegel, Flanagan Warns that Brexit Must Not Impact on Anglo-Irish and EU 




223. Unattributed, Police Chiefs Pledge Continued Border Co-operation Whatever Brexit 
Brings, BELFAST TELEGRAPH (Nov. 7, 2018), 
https://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/police-chiefs-pledge-continued-
border-cooperation-whatever-brexit-brings-37503123.html [https://perma.cc/Z2RH-87S9]. 
Niall O’Connor, Garda Commissioner Drew Harris Tells Summit that Brexit Will Not Harm 
Cross-Border Policing Efforts, IRISH TIMES (Nov. 7, 2018), 
https://www.irishmirror.ie/news/irish-news/garda-commissioner-drew-harris-tells-13550656 
[https://perma.cc/RJJ7-6NKH]. 
2020] THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK 657 
membership.224 It is clear that the United Kingdom has placed high 
value on these databases as it is part of the Schengen Information 
System (“SIS II”), the European Criminal Record Information System 
(“ECRIS”), the Passenger Name Records (“PNR”), Europol 
Information System (“EIS”), and Prüm.225 The reason why the risks of 
the UK having limited access to such databases are real are because of 
the lack of third-party membership precedents, the removal of CJEU 
jurisdiction, concerns about the adequacy of data protection and the 
loss of Article 8 protections under the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union.226 It raises a number of problems for practical 
policing and prosecutorial cooperation, particularly given the 
increasingly cross-border nature of criminal activity.227 
As demonstrated above, the United Kingdom’s decision to leave 
the European Union creates a significant challenge for the governance 
of security. The potential for border infrastructure or border checks 
between Northern Ireland and the rest of the United Kingdom or 
Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland has been met with threats 
from dissident republicans and more recently some loyalist groups. 
Both Brexit “solutions” put forward have the potential to incite 
paramilitary violence and raise serious challenges to the governance of 
security in the United Kingdom. What is clear is that both the May and 
Johnson Conservative governments have prioritized “sovereignty” 
concerns (illustrated here by ending the jurisdiction of the CJEU) over 
the warnings from police figures and legal experts about the 
consequences of losing access to many essential tools for policing, 
justice, and security cooperation. 
VIII. CONCLUSION: BREXIT AND THE LIMITATIONS OF LAW 
In this final section, we wish to examine the role of law in general 
and rights discourses in particular in the context of Brexit. The 
centrality of human rights protections to the Good Friday Agreement 
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and the broader peace process in Northern Ireland has been much 
discussed elsewhere.228 As McCrudden has argued, the source of these 
rights are diverse—”with devolved, national, international and 
supranational elements layered on top of each other”—and their object 
was to protect the dual national makeup of the local population as well 
as the broader human rights and equality provisions which “transcend 
the issue of differing national allegiances.”229 The Good Friday 
Agreement explicitly commits to “the protection and vindication of the 
human rights of all” (para 2) and notes the obligations of the “sovereign 
government” in relation to “the principles of full respect for and 
equality of civil, political, social and cultural rights” (para 1v). This 
latter part of the Agreement also includes reference to the right of the 
people of Northern Ireland “to identify themselves and be accepted as 
Irish or British or both, as they may so choose” (para 1vi). 
In addition, as noted above, Irish and UK membership of the 
European Union is clearly assumed as axiomatic both in the key 
antecedent agreements and the Good Friday Agreement itself. This 
international treaty affirms in its preamble the desire of the British and 
Irish governments to: “develop still further the unique relationship 
between their peoples and the close co-operation between their 
countries as friendly neighbours and as partners in the European 
Union.” 
Article 17 of the Agreement also commits the North South 
Ministerial Council to considering “the European Union dimension of 
relevant matters, including the implementation of EU policies and 
programmes under consideration in the EU framework.”230 We argue 
that these rights are fundamentally affected by Brexit and that, despite 
the apparent promises of the Good Friday Agreement and its enabling 
legislation, law has failed to protect these rights and by extension the 
broader peace process. We will also argue that the manifest limitations 
of legalism provide a useful corrective to the risks of overselling human 
rights in the broader political and legal conversations concerning both 
 
228. See generally Paul Mageean & Martin O’Brien, From the Margins to the 
Mainstream: Human Rights and the Good Friday Agreement 22 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1499 
(1998); HUMAN RIGHTS, EQUALITY AND DEMOCRATIC RENEWAL IN NORTHERN IRELAND 
(Colin Harvey ed., 2001); JENNIFER CURTIS, HUMAN RIGHTS AS WAR BY OTHER MEANS: 
PEACE POLITICS IN NORTHERN IRELAND (2014). 
229. Chris McCrudden, The Belfast-Good Friday Agreement, Brexit & Rights, ROYAL 
IRISH ACADEMY/BRITISH ACADEMY 3 (2017). 
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the governance of Northern Ireland and indeed with regard to the 
potential of a united Ireland. 
One direct legal consequence of Brexit will be that people in 
Northern Ireland will not have the ability to use the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights (“ECFR”) as a means of asserting the rights 
developed in the European Union since the 2007 Lisbon Treaty. 
Although the ECFR is an instrument of comparative infancy, it 
contains important additional provisions to the European Convention 
on Human Rights concerning economic and social rights—effectively, 
the single-market rights—of living, traveling, working and claiming 
benefits around the European Union, plus the democratic rights of 
engaging with the European Parliament.231 These rights are ultimately 
enforceable through the CJEU. Although the UK (along with Poland) 
secured what they believed to be an opt-out to Charter (Protocol 30 of 
the Lisbon Treaty), in practice it affirms many of the fundamental 
rights already recognized in EU laws to which the UK government has 
signed up.232 A central challenge will be whether Irish passport holders 
in Northern Ireland will be able to access the same services in the 
Republic and throughout the European Union as their fellow Irish 
citizens who live south of the border—a concern which has featured 
prominently for nationalists.233 
More generally, Brexit has been the subject of a number of 
important legal challenges to the power of the Executive in the UK 
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courts. In R v Miller,234 the government lost (8-3) in the UK Supreme 
Court on the key question as to whether or not it could trigger 
withdrawal from the European Union as prescribed by Article 50 of the 
TEU without an Act of Parliament using the Executive’s ‘Foreign 
Affairs Powers.’ Having lost, the government was forced to bring the 
first EU (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill 2017 before the House of 
Commons two days later. Further, in August 2019, in an apparent effort 
to avoid detailed parliamentary scrutiny of his Brexit plans, the new 
Conservative Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, prorogued parliament for 
five weeks, reconvening just seventeen days before the United 
Kingdom’s scheduled departure from the European Union. In the 
ensuing legal challenge which eventually reached the Supreme Court, 
the government again lost (11-0).235 The government losses on both of 
these major cases before the Supreme Court were understandably 
celebrated in Britain by those opposed to Brexit as evidence of the 
courts upholding parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law.236 
However, from the vantage point of the Irish peace process, the 
Good Friday Agreement and the devolution settlement, the limitations 
of the law have been laid bare. This is apparent in a number of Northern 
Ireland related legal challenges to Brexit brought by politicians and 
civil society activists. These cases focus on the central question as to 
whether or not authorization from Parliament is required before the 
British government can trigger Article 50 and thus exit the European 
Union. 
In Agnew and McCord (heard together in the High Court in 
Belfast), a key argument put forward was that the prerogative power is 
not available in relation to the triggering of Article 50 because it is 
displaced by the Northern Ireland Act 1998 and the Good Friday 
Agreement and British-Irish Agreements that underpin it. In their view 
the provisions of the Northern Ireland Act 1998 are “inextricably 
 
234. Miller & Anor, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European 
Union (Rev 3) [2017] UKSC 5. 
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woven” with continuing membership of the European Union. 237 
McCord’s lawyers argued further that, since a majority in Northern 
Ireland had voted to remain in the European Union, the withdrawal 
process effectively amounted to a change in the constitutional status of 
Northern Ireland - again contrary to the Good Friday Agreement and 
section 1 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998.238  In respect of all of these 
issues, Justice Maguire dismissed the applications, stating the consent 
principle related only to the question of whether or not Northern Ireland 
should remain part of the United Kingdom and not to other 
constitutional changes such as leaving the European Union.239 
Part of the first Miller judgment before the Supreme Court also 
examined whether any legislation authorizing the triggering of Article 
50 would require the granting of a Legislative Consent Motion by the 
devolved Assemblies.240 The judges were unanimous in finding that 
there is no legal requirement to secure the consent of the devolved 
institutions (in Scotland and Northern Ireland). They concluded that 
neither Section 1 nor Section 75 of the Northern Ireland Act is of 
assistance in this case, and that the Sewel Convention - that 
Westminster should not legislate for devolved matters without the 
consent of the devolved legislature - was precisely that, a convention 
rather than a legally enforceable obligation.241 In the second Miller 
case, the Supreme Court also heard arguments (from Ronan Lavery QC 
again on behalf of Mr. McCord) that a no deal Brexit would lead to 
chaos, economic misery and would fundamentally undermine the peace 
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process. Given that the focus of the case was on the prorogation of 
parliament, Mr. Lavery was told by the judges during the hearing 
(correctly in our view) that his submissions were not sufficiently 
relevant and the issue does not feature in the judgment.242 
In a separate legal challenge heard by the Northern Ireland Court 
of Appeal (again involving Mr. McCord as one of the litigants and Mr. 
Lavery QC as counsel) the court heard arguments that the some of the 
UK government’s proposals in negotiating with the European Union 
on withdrawal did not protect the Good Friday Agreement and/or were 
not compatible with the Northern Ireland Act 1998.243 In particular, this 
case focused on the Section 10(1) of the EU Withdrawal Act 2018, on 
the “Continuation of North-South co-operation and the prevention of 
new border arrangements,” which requires that, “[i]n exercising any of 
the powers under this Act, a Minister of the Crown or devolved 
authority must (a) act in a way that is compatible with the terms of the 
Northern Ireland Act 1998.”244 The Lord Chief Justice of Northern 
Ireland, Sir Declan Morgan, who heard the appeal with two other senior 
judges, acknowledged the applicants’ submission that: 
a UK withdrawal from the EU without an agreement would give 
rise to the very considerable risk of a deterioration in the security 
situation in Northern Ireland, an adverse impact on the Northern 
Ireland economy and a severe limitation on the work of the 
implementation bodies operating with the support of the North-
South Ministerial Council.245 
Nonetheless, he and his fellow judges concluded that the 
Executive is exercising prerogative powers in its negotiations with the 
European Union and that “Section 10 of the EU Withdrawal Act 2018 
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does not expressly or by necessary implication abrogate that exercise 
of prerogative power.”246 
In sum, the courts have undoubtedly reasserted the authority of 
the UK parliament over the Executive in the two Miller cases. As Elliot 
has argued, while the first Miller judgment may be viewed as a 
“progressive blow against the archaism of Crown prerogative” it also 
represents a defense of a rather traditional approach—seeing the UK 
constitution exclusively as a contest between the Executive and the 
Westminster Parliament—a vision that is “myopically bilateral in 
nature.”247 In reviewing the earlier Northern Ireland cases, as well as 
the devolution facing aspects of Miller 1, Anthony has similarly argued 
that the very traditional notions of sovereignty adopted by the courts in 
these cases—in effect that the sovereignty of Westminster trumps all 
of the complexities of the competing claims and allegiances contained 
in the Good Friday Agreement and Northern Ireland Act—illustrate 
that Brexit has taken “ . . . power-hoarding to its logical – and perhaps 
even undemocratic - conclusion.”248 McCrudden and Halberstam have 
been even more critical of the performance of the courts in these cases.  
They refer to the “cursory” and “cavalier” nature of the first Miller 
judgment on the issues relating to Northern Ireland—a judgement 
which (they argue) ignored the political circumstances of devolution in 
Northern Ireland, the international underpinnings of the NI 
constitution, the effects of Brexit on the North-South bodies and which 
failed to address the myriad rights issues raised in Northern Ireland 
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based Brexit litigation.249 We agree. In short, law has largely failed to 
protect the Good Friday Agreement, some key rights guaranteed 
therein, and more broadly, the peace process in Ireland. 
That said, perhaps one should not have expected anything 
different. A central plank of the Vote Leave campaign and the 
subsequent “let’s get Brexit done” approach has been to dismiss experts 
and expertise as “naysayers” getting in the way of the great Brexit 
vision. In light of numerous warnings from authoritative economic 
sources about the consequences of Brexit, one of the Vote Leave 
leaders, Conservative MP Michael Gove, famously declared, “people 
in this country have had enough of experts.”250 This has become a 
mantra amongst Brexiteers. Regardless the empirical facts, Brexit 
leaders have adopted a deliberately demotic style of speaking, claiming 
to be at one with “ordinary people,” addressing their fears and 
anxieties, breaking taboos and “telling it like it is on issues like 
immigration” and of course “taking back control.”251 
Fuller has argued persuasively that the “anti-expert revolution” 
evident in the Brexit process speaks to what he terms a “post-truth” 
phenomenon, part which of resonates with the Rousseauian idea that 
“there is a special wisdom to be found in crowds, especially when they 
are agreed on a course of action, even if it remains radically unclear 
how it might be brought about and what its outcomes might look 
like.”252 In such a context, any truth, fact, expert opinion, or indeed 
legal finding which impedes Brexit is inevitably subject to hysterical 
reactions concerning the will of the British public.253 For example, 
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when the High Court delivered the first Miller judgment, the British 
Daily Mail front-page headline (complete with pictures of the three 
judges) was, “Enemies of the People: Fury Over ‘Out of Touch’ Judges 
who Have ‘Declared War on Democracy’ by Defying 17.4 million 
Brexit Voters and who Could Trigger Constitutional Crisis.”254 When 
judges experienced such a reaction to a judgment which after all 
reasserted traditional British parliamentary sovereignty, perhaps 
expecting a judgement which said that the Good Friday Agreement 
could trump Brexit and thwart the United Kingdom from leaving the 
European Union was really quite an ask. 
As we have noted above, one of the direct consequences of Brexit 
has been the re-energizing of discussions on a united Ireland. Like 
Brexit, a united Ireland would represent quite a seismic constitutional 
and political change on these islands and its advocates have rightly 
argued that it requires careful debate, discussion and planning.255 There 
are important lessons to be learned from the experience of Brexit 
concerning the role and limitations of law in such a process—
particularly with regard to human rights and the notion of sovereignty, 
two central components of the Brexit project. 
With regard to human rights, as the eminent anthropologist 
Clifford Geertz has suggested, part of the lure of law is that it represents 
a way of seeing the world not necessarily as it is but rather as we would 
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like it to be—“the sense, without which human beings can hardly live 
at all, much less adjudicate anything, that truth, vice, falsehood, and 
virtue are real, distinguishable, and appropriately aligned.”256 One of 
the authors has written previously about the limitations of legalism in 
post-conflict societies like Northern Ireland.257 Drawing from research 
in a range of transitional societies, and influenced by “critical friends” 
to the human rights movement such as Baxi, Ignatieff, and Kennedy,258 
McEvoy argued against a version of rights discourses wherein the real 
world of confusion, messiness, and tough choices is translated through 
rights discourses into the legalese of international standards and legal 
certainty.259 McEvoy did not suggest throwing the baby out with the 
bathwater. Human rights can and should provide a practical and 
normative framework for the hard graft of political persuasion and 
argumentation. Of course, framing the legal and constitutional 
architecture of what a united Ireland would look like, particularly in 
terms of guaranteeing the political identity, culture and human rights 
of Ulster unionists would be a central part of such a process.260 
However, human rights guarantees are, as Harvey has also argued, 
“only a beginning” rather than an end in itself.261 They certainly cannot 
magically resolve fundamentally political contests on profoundly 
complex matters of political identity. 
Similar lessons should be learned from the ways in which 
sovereignty has been understood and deployed by Brexiteers. In his 
widely critiqued book on eminent Victorians,262 the leading Brexiteer 
and unapologetic advocate of empire nostalgia, Jacob Rees-Mogg, 
includes a chapter on Professor Albert Venn Dicey, Vinerian Professor 
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of English Law at Oxford.263 Dicey is best known for his exposition of 
the legal theory of parliamentary sovereignty. He was also an 
enthusiastic imperialist,264 an ardent unionist,265 and is described by 
Rees-Mogg as the “father of the referendum” in British politics (Dicey 
believed that a referendum could prevent Home Rule in Ireland).266 In 
short, Dicey embodies the fusion of imperial delusion, hard-line 
unionism, a convenient belief in referenda when deployed in favor of 
one’s own cause, and the narrow understanding of sovereignty that 
underpins the Brexit project. 
If Irish republicans and nationalists are to succeed in persuading 
their unionist countrymen and women of the benefits of a united 
Ireland, they will have to do so much better than the Brexiteers. Misty-
eyed republicanism is as likely to resonate with Ulster unionists as did 
the empire nostalgia of Rees-Mogg and his Brexiteer colleagues 
amongst Irish nationalists. As discussed above, whilst the Good Friday 
Agreement provides the mechanism by which a border poll on a united 
Ireland can take place, unlike Brexit, such a poll should not be an end 
in itself but rather one stage in a carefully thought-through plan. More 
broadly, the related discussions on sovereignty will have to be more 
intellectually ambitious than that which posits sovereignty as a 
constitutional arrangement between the Executive, Parliament (or 
Executives and Parliaments if the devolved government and Assembly 
in the North were retained) and the people. 
As Morison has argued, it is important to stop considering 
sovereignty as only “a thing in itself” and rather to view it as a way of 
thinking about power and governance more generally, recognizing that 
the constitutional “big fix” is but one element of a broader mosaic of 
innovative small fixes beyond the state.267 Brexit and its fall-out have 
provided the road map for how not to do it. Perhaps, we will all be 
grateful for that in the final analysis. 
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